After a disappointing end to an otherwise impressive playoff run, the Canadiens enter one of the most important offseasons in recent franchise history. Much has been made of their struggles in the Eastern Conference Final, particularly the significant difference in games played between Montreal and Carolina entering the series. While fatigue may have played a role, using it as the primary explanation would risk overlooking some legitimate issues within the roster construction. The Canadiens' core is firmly in place, but the next two offseasons will be crucial in determining whether this group remains a good team or takes the next step toward becoming a true Stanley Cup contender.

Shots have been one of the biggest storylines of Montreal’s playoff run. By the end of the postseason, the Canadiens will finish with a shot share of roughly 44%. However, many fans have pointed to fatigue as the primary reason for their struggles in the Eastern Conference Final, so for the sake of argument, let’s just focus on the first two rounds instead.

Through their first 14 playoff games, the Canadiens posted a 46.7% SF%. For context, no Stanley Cup champion since at least 2000 has finished a playoff run with a shot share that low. Consistently being outshot over an extended period is generally not a sustainable path to long-term success.

In fact, only seven Stanley Cup champions since 2000 finished their championship season with a playoff SF% below 50%, and just four finished below 49%. While Montreal’s playoff run was undoubtedly impressive, their underlying numbers suggest there is still work to be done before this team can be considered a true contender.

It is true that the Canadiens are not built around generating a high volume of shots, which is perfectly acceptable if it is supported by a strong defensive structure. The problem is that Montreal did not consistently suppress chances against this season. At 5-on-5, the Canadiens ranked 18th in shots against and 26th in expected goals against.

If a team is going to sacrifice volume in favour of shot quality, it needs to make up for it by limiting opportunities at the other end of the ice. Montreal failed to do that. In fact, only five Canadiens players finished the regular season with a SF% above 51%.

For that reason, Montreal’s biggest priority this offseason should be adding players capable of driving play and controlling possession in the middle of the lineup. The Canadiens have established their core, but they still need more players who can consistently tilt the ice in their favour.

Playing armchair GM for a moment, there are a few players in this year’s free agent class who could help address some of Montreal’s biggest weaknesses.

The first is Michael Bunting. His ability to generate scoring chances off passes would fit well within Montreal’s quality-over-quantity offensive approach, and he remains one of the stronger forechecking forwards available on the market. Bunting could serve as an effective short-term solution on the Canadiens’ third line while the organization continues searching for a more permanent answer.

Another intriguing option is Oliver Bjorkstrand. While he endured a disappointing season in Tampa Bay and posted the lowest points-per-82-games rate of his career, his transition game remains elite. Bjorkstrand ranks in the 91st percentile in zone exits and the 82nd percentile in zone entries in 2025-26. Improving puck movement through the neutral zone will be critical if Montreal wants to become a team that consistently controls play, and Bjorkstrand would help address that need immediately.

Finally, Kailer Yamamoto would be a worthwhile target for the bottom six. While he is unlikely to provide significant offensive production, he remains an effective complementary play-driver who can help push play in the right direction. Yamamoto also brings with him the best on-ice numbers of my three suggestions. He finished the year with a 55.5% xGF% and a 53.4% SF%, the only one of these three to be above 50% in both stats at 5-on-5.

None of these players would be considered flashy additions, but each would help address some of the underlying issues that might prevent Montreal from becoming a true contender. This isn’t about getting “bigger” or “meaner,” or chasing whatever buzzword is being used to justify overpaying a below-average fourth liner. It’s about taking an honest look at the areas where the Canadiens need to improve and targeting players who can help close the gap between their on-ice results and those of recent Stanley Cup contenders.

Montreal could also look to package some of its future assets to acquire the second-line center this team desperately needs. Robert Thomas is the biggest name who is realistically available currently, and his two-way game would go a long way toward stabilizing the Canadiens’ top six. That said, there may be value in remaining patient. If the Edmonton Oilers fail to meet expectations during the 2026-27 season, Montreal could find itself in a position to make a compelling offer for an even bigger target. Given the age of the Canadiens’ core and the amount of runway this group still has, waiting another year before pushing all of their chips to the center of the table may be a risk worth taking.

When it comes to the blue line, patience is likely the best course of action. Three of Montreal’s top four spots appear to be locked in for the foreseeable future, and a healthy David Reinbacher should be given every opportunity to earn the fourth role. That said, the Canadiens essentially operated with a five-man unit throughout much of the playoffs, making it clear that improving the depth of the unit should be a priority. While a major addition may not be necessary, finding a more reliable option for the sixth defence spot would help strengthen the blue line and provide valuable insurance over the course of an 84-game season and a potential playoff run.

One player I would like to see the Canadiens take a chance on is pending RFA Michael Kesselring. Kesselring has shown he can be an effective bottom-pairing, two-way defenseman, but he appeared to fall out of favour in Buffalo after putting together several solid seasons in Arizona and Utah. Given Montreal’s need for more reliable depth on the blue line, he could represent a low-risk addition with some upside. There is a reasonable chance the Sabres choose not to qualify him this summer, but even if they do, the acquisition cost should be relatively modest considering he appeared in just 34 games this season.

As for a true shutdown defenseman, there are not many players who fit exactly what Montreal needs. On the surface, Connor Murphy could be an intriguing option, but his inability to consistently deny zone entries makes him a less-than-ideal fit. For a Canadiens team that already spends too much time defending in its own end, the priority should be finding a defender who can disrupt plays before they develop rather than simply reacting once the opposition has established possession.

The Canadiens’ 2026 run feels somewhat similar to that of the New York Rangers over the past decade. The Rangers were consistently a good team and regularly made the playoffs, but they often struggled to control play at an elite level and ultimately fell short of winning a Stanley Cup.

That is why Montreal’s next few roster decisions will be so important. The Canadiens have assembled a talented young core, but they cannot afford to assume internal development alone will solve their underlying issues. Hopefully, having Jeff Gorton in the front office means the organization can learn from some of the shortcomings of those Rangers teams rather than repeating them.

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“When you’re an average team with high expectations, you’re going to be disappointed.” Those were Connor McDavid’s words after the Oilers were eliminated in six games by the Anaheim Ducks.

The Ducks are a fun, young team with real upside, but they are far from contenders. Anaheim entered the playoffs ranked 13th in xGF% and 23rd in GF% at five-on-five. Their special teams weren’t much better, finishing 23rd on the power play and 27th on the penalty kill. This isn’t a shot at Anaheim, but it puts Edmonton’s loss into perspective.

The Edmonton Oilers are staring down the final two years of McDavid’s contract. Losing to a team at this level simply cannot happen at this stage.

McDavid himself didn’t have his best series, injury or not. He finished with just one goal and six points, but this wasn’t a one-man issue. Edmonton had five players produce at a point-per-game pace or better, yet still managed to win just two games.

So the question becomes: how did a team with this much talent end up here, and more importantly, what can they do to salvage the final years of McDavid’s prime?

The Forwards

The Edmonton Oilers, without Connor McDavid on the ice, posted a 45.2% GF% and a 47% xGF% at five-on-five. If you want to contend, that simply isn’t good enough. Your team needs to be able to drive play without its best player.

For context, the Colorado Avalanche, without Nathan MacKinnon, posted a 57.4% GF% and a 58.3% xGF%. That’s what a true contender looks like.

Who on this roster can you move, and more importantly, who actually holds enough value to bring back meaningful assets? Let’s start with the expiring contracts.

The good news for the Edmonton Oilers is they are shedding approximately $10.5 million in salary from forwards who didn’t make a meaningful impact this season. The bad news is they now need to replace at least four roster spots with limited cap space.

They could bring a few of those players back to fill out the bottom of the lineup, but “running it back” with this group likely won’t sit well with a Connor McDavid who just called the team average.

If they aren’t used in a trade, Matt Savoie and Isaac Howard need to become impact players next season. Their cheap contracts are critical for building out a competitive roster, but they also represent two of Edmonton’s most valuable trade chips. If the Oilers decide to move either, they need to be getting real, immediate value in return.

Speaking of tradable assets, the forward group doesn’t offer many easy decisions. McDavid, Leon Draisaitl, Ryan Nugent-Hopkins, and Trent Frederic (yikes) all hold full no-move clauses. It’s difficult to envision any of them waiving for a team that isn’t already a legitimate contender.

That leaves the Oilers with very little flexibility. Players like Mattias Janmark simply can’t be part of the solution next season. His $1.45 million cap hit doesn’t create much space, but a one-goal, eight-point campaign just isn’t good enough for a team trying to contend.

Zach Hyman is where things get interesting. He carries an eight-team trade list and a manageable $5.5 million cap hit for the next two seasons, which should make him attractive on the market. But moving him comes with real risk.

When healthy, Hyman is one of the most effective complementary top-six wingers in the league, and replacing that level of impact at a similar price point won’t be easy. At the same time, injuries limited him this season, and his 2024–25 performance raises some concern about long-term decline.

Ultimately, Hyman may be the cleanest way to shake up this forward group, but it’s far from a simple decision. Moving him creates flexibility, but it also opens another hole that Edmonton may not be equipped to fill internally.

Options like Anthony Mantha or Bobby McMann could be targeted in free agency at a similar or slightly lower cap hit, but neither offers the same ceiling Hyman brings when he’s at his best.

The Defence

The Edmonton Oilers blueline comes with its own set of problems. Darnell Nurse, Mattias Ekholm, and Jake Walman all carry full no-move clauses while taking up a significant portion of the team’s cap. Connor Murphy is set to hit free agency, and after a solid season, he’s likely someone Edmonton would have interest in bringing back, but his AAV could become an issue.

Realistically, there are only two paths forward here.

The first is trying to move Nurse. That likely involves taking back another problematic contract to avoid attaching additional assets. The cleanest hypothetical fit is a swap with the Toronto Maple Leafs for Morgan Rielly. Both players feel like they’ve plateaued in their current environments, and this is one of the few scenarios where you could realistically see both waiving their no-move clauses.

Would Rielly frustrate Oilers fans? Probably. Does it actually improve the defence? That’s less clear. At best, it gives Edmonton a different look stylistically and hopes that a change of scenery unlocks something. But that’s more of a gamble than a solution.

The second, and far more aggressive option, is moving Evan Bouchard. Bouchard is easily the most valuable asset on the roster without trade protection. The problem is that dealing with him creates a massive hole on the blue line.

The only way a Bouchard trade makes sense is if it brings back a legitimate number one defenceman, and those players rarely hit the market. You can talk yourself into hypothetical swaps, like one involving Adam Fox and the New York Rangers, but even then, you’re not clearly improving; you’re just reshuffling elite talent.

And that’s really the issue with both paths. Whether it’s a Nurse deal or a Bouchard blockbuster, these moves don’t definitively make the Oilers better. They just make them different.

Maybe that’s enough to reset the room and buy time with Connor McDavid. But if the goal is to get closer to a Stanley Cup, it’s hard to see either option truly moving the needle.

The Goalies

Let’s be clear, the Edmonton Oilers made their bed here. Now they have to live in it.

They cannot, under any circumstances, move out assets to dump Tristan Jarry less than a year after paying to acquire him. That kind of asset management is exactly what put them in this position in the first place.

So what are their options? Hope.

Hope that Jarry finds his game again and returns to something close to his peak form. Or hope that a cheap backup emerges and steals the net. That’s it.

One of the most obvious flaws on this roster simply isn’t worth fixing at the cost it would require. Unless another GM is willing to take Jarry for free, Edmonton is stuck betting on internal improvement at the most volatile position on the ice.

The Nuclear Option

After looking through this roster, there isn’t a clear path to true contention without getting extremely lucky and hitting on every single bet they make. The other option is much harsher: admit this window has failed.

There is almost no chance management actually considers it, but the odds of turning this current group into a legitimate contender over the next two offseasons are just as low.

So what does that leave? A very difficult conversation.

Go to Connor McDavid. Be honest about where things stand. Ask for a list of teams he’d be willing to go to, and do right by the second-best player in franchise history while jumpstarting the next version of this team.

Because this didn’t fail overnight. Years of mismanagement led here, and there has to be accountability for how this era was handled.

The Edmonton Oilers never consistently built a true supporting cast around McDavid. Too many assets were moved out for short-term fixes that didn’t move the needle. Too many contracts aged poorly the moment they were signed. And beyond the top of the roster, the pipeline never produced enough impact talent to sustain a contender.

The result is what we’re seeing now: a team that can still look dangerous on any given night, but one that isn’t structurally built to win four playoff rounds.

That’s why this is the nuclear option. Not because it’s easy, but because it might be the only path that actually resets the trajectory of the franchise.

Because let’s be honest, most of the moves available to Edmonton this summer are marginal at best. Those are the types of tweaks you make when you’re already an elite team, not one that just lost in six games to the Anaheim Ducks.

At this point, Edmonton’s hopes rest almost entirely on McDavid delivering another superhuman playoff run. But if 42 points in 25 games, alongside arguably the best supporting cast he’s had in Edmonton, wasn’t enough, it’s fair to ask what more can realistically be expected.

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The Brad Treliving era in Toronto is officially over, but why did it fail so miserably? A lot of people point to the lack of high-end production from the Leafs’ core and the number of expensive deals at the top of the roster. But are those really the biggest issues, and how easily can they be addressed by Toronto’s next GM?

The first thing people look at is the drop in production from Auston Matthews over the past three seasons. His points per 82 games have fallen from 108 to 95 to 72.

That’s not what you expect from a franchise player. What’s interesting, though, is that his deployment hasn’t really changed. His offensive zone usage has stayed almost identical, so the opportunities have still been there.

But this isn’t just on Matthews.

It’s no secret that Craig Berube runs a defence-first system, and that can limit overall offensive output. In the seasons after he left both Philadelphia and St. Louis, those teams saw a jump in expected goals for. In Toronto, it’s been the opposite. Over his two years, the Leafs have seen a steady decline in xGF.

Some of that is clearly tied to losing Mitch Marner. But even with that factored in, this is still a lineup that should not be sitting 25th in xGF. A more offensive-minded coach likely could have gotten more out of this group.

Matthews’ drop in production is not a simple, one-variable issue. But he’s also not the main reason this era failed. In fact, if the next two, much more fixable issues were addressed, his decline probably would have felt a lot less significant.

The Leafs severely lack offensive punch on the blue line with their current roster construction.

Only three defence pairs posted an xGF% above 50%. One of those was Tanev–McCabe, who played just 11 games together. Another was McCabe–Benoit, and they barely cleared the mark at 50.4%. The only pair that showed any real stability was Rielly–OEL at 52.7%.

Even then, none of these pairs were driving offence at a high level.

The Leafs’ top defence pair in xGF/60 was McCabe–Stecher, and they ranked just 90th out of 311 qualified pairs across the NHL. That tells you everything you need to know about the lack of offensive impact from the back end.

Finally, Toronto has gotten almost no secondary scoring from its bottom six.

Nick Robertson is the only current Leaf outside of the top six in TOI/GP to eclipse 30 points this season. Easton Cowan is the only other forward outside that group producing at a 30-point pace over 82 games (minimum 30 GP).

That’s just not good enough.

To put it in perspective, the Chicago Blackhawks, who rank last in goals per game this season, have four players outside their top six producing at a 30-point pace.

It gets worse when you look at how Toronto tried to replace Mitch Marner’s production.

Roy (as a Leaf), Maccelli, and Joshua were all brought in last offseason to help offset that loss. Combined, they’ve produced just six more goals and one fewer point than Marner has on his own this season, despite this being his worst point pace since 2017–18.

Ultimately, this version of the Leafs felt like an overcorrection.

After years of criticism toward the more skill-heavy, analytically driven Kyle Dubas era, Toronto clearly tried to shift toward a more “old school” identity under Brad Treliving. They prioritized size, defensive structure, and experience, especially on the back end and in the bottom six.

But in doing so, they lost what made them dangerous in the first place.

The team became harder to play against, but also significantly easier to defend. The offensive ceiling dropped, the blue line stopped creating, and the lack of depth scoring became impossible to ignore. Instead of finding balance, Toronto swung too far in the opposite direction.

And that’s the frustrating part. Most of these issues are fixable.

The core is still in place. The problems aren’t rooted in a lack of talent, but rather in how that talent is being deployed and supported. With the right adjustments to the blue line, a clearer focus on adding secondary scoring, and a system that actually maximizes offensive strengths, this team can look very different in a short amount of time.

But it all comes down to the next hire.

If Toronto wants to salvage this era of Leafs hockey, they need to get this decision right because the window isn’t closed, but it’s definitely starting to close.

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On April 19, 2019, the Detroit Red Wings brought one of the greatest players in franchise history back home to serve as their next general manager. Steve Yzerman was tasked with guiding the organization through a difficult rebuild and returning the team to contention. Excitement around Detroit was understandably high at the time due to his successful work in Tampa Bay, but what has he actually accomplished over his seven years as GM of the Red Wings? And how does his rebuild compare to others that began around the same time?

The Early Years

The 2018–19 Red Wings were a mess. Only four players on their end-of-season roster finished above one win above replacement. Meanwhile, 10 players who played at least 40 games ended the year with a negative WAR. The future outlook was not much better either, as Dobber Prospects had Detroit ranked 22nd in their organizational prospect rankings heading into the 2018–19 season.

Detroit’s pipeline was highlighted by names such as Michael Rasmussen, Tyler Bertuzzi, Evgeny Svechnikov, Dennis Cholowski, Filip Hronek, Filip Zadina, Joe Veleno, and Jonatan Berggren. While this group contained some intriguing players, none were viewed as true blue-chip prospects. Yzerman was taking over a disaster of a roster and had plenty of work to do.

Yzerman’s first draft would see him land a major hit at sixth overall with cornerstone defenseman Moritz Seider. However, the rest of the class was far less impactful. The Red Wings have only gotten a combined 214 NHL games from the other ten players selected in that draft, with Albert Johansson and Elmer Söderblom being the only two to appear in the NHL so far.

The 2019–20 Red Wings were about as bad as expected, finishing the season with a 17–49–5 record, good enough for last place in the NHL. Yzerman did not make many major moves that year aside from selling off Andreas Athanasiou to Edmonton and absorbing Marc Staal’s contract from the Rangers in exchange for three second-round picks.

The Rebuild

Despite falling back three spots in the draft lottery, the Red Wings still managed to land another key piece of their rebuild in Lucas Raymond at fourth overall. Once again, however, the rest of the draft class has not aged particularly well. Detroit has only gotten 29 NHL games from the other 11 players selected in the 2020 draft.

The 2020–21 season was expected to be another throwaway year for the Red Wings. Detroit finished with a 19–27–10 record, good for the sixth-worst record in the league.

This season also marked the first major swing of Yzerman’s tenure, as he traded Anthony Mantha to the Washington Capitals in exchange for Richard Panik, Jakub Vrana, a first-round pick in 2021, and a second-round pick in 2022. At the time, the move was widely praised. Yzerman was able to move off Mantha, who did not fit Detroit’s timeline, while adding a skilled forward in Vrana, along with two valuable draft picks.

In hindsight, the results of the trade did not age as well. Vrana got off to an incredible start in Detroit, recording 11 points in his first 11 games with the team. However, injuries and a stint in the NHL’s Player Assistance Program derailed his time with the Red Wings, eventually leading to his waiver placement and a trade to the St. Louis Blues for a minor leaguer and a seventh-round pick a few years later. The situation with Vrana was in no way Yzerman’s fault. The trade was well executed at the time, but circumstances ultimately did not work out in Detroit’s favour.

The 2021 draft would once again see the Red Wings add a key piece to their blueline with Simon Edvinsson at sixth overall. Detroit also selected goalie prospect Sebastian Cossa, who has had a strong start to his professional career in the AHL, posting a .915 save percentage through his first three full seasons in Grand Rapids. However, once again, the picks after the first round have yet to yield meaningful results for Detroit, with just one NHL game played between the other six players selected in that draft.

The Red Wings would post a 32–40–10 record during the 2021–22 season, finishing 12th in the Eastern Conference while beginning to show signs of a turnaround. This was also the first time we saw Yzerman begin moving assets to acquire more established NHL talent. In two offseason deals, he traded Richard Panik, Jonathan Bernier, a second-round pick, and a third-round pick to acquire Nick Leddy and Alex Nedeljkovic.

The Nedeljkovic trade looked like a good bet at the time. He had just posted a 15.19 GSAx during the 2020–21 season, which ranked fourth in the NHL. However, that performance would prove to be a massive outlier, as he has not recorded a positive GSAx again since.

The Nick Leddy deal was a bit more puzzling. His underlying numbers had been trending downward since the 2016–17 season, and he had steadily been losing minutes in New York over the previous few years. He also did not provide much offensive impact from the blueline, which was something Detroit badly needed at the time. Leddy was eventually flipped to the St. Louis Blues at the trade deadline for Oskar Sundqvist, Jake Walman, and a second-round pick. That move ended up being a solid pivot by Yzerman, but it still raises questions about the price Detroit paid to acquire Leddy in the first place.

The Corner?

The 2022 offseason is where I believe Yzerman made his biggest mistakes. The Red Wings improved from a 42.9% points percentage in 2020–21 to 45.1% in 2021–22, but instead of continuing to weaponize his cap space for additional assets, Yzerman chose to get aggressive in free agency.

He first traded a third-round pick to acquire Ville Husso from the St. Louis Blues, once again attempting to solve Detroit’s long-standing issues in goal. While the move itself was questionable, it signalled a shift in approach for the organization.

The real turning point came in free agency. With significant cap space available, Yzerman handed out several large contracts in an effort to accelerate Detroit’s progress toward playoff contention. Below is a chart outlining the five biggest deals signed during that offseason.

The Perron signing was likely the “safest” bet of the group based on his 2021–22 season, but the overall strategy was overly aggressive for where the Red Wings were in their rebuild. Detroit was still a team that needed to accumulate assets and develop young talent, not one that should have been pushing its chips toward immediate contention. The results of the 2022–23 season seemed to support that concern. Even with the aggressive additions, the Red Wings finished 35–37–10, placing 12th in the Eastern Conference.

During the 2022–23 season, the Red Wings ended up selling off Filip Hronek, Tyler Bertuzzi, and a fourth-round pick in a series of deadline moves that brought back two first-round picks, a second-round pick, and a fourth-round pick. The returns themselves were strong, particularly in the Hronek deal.

However, the decision to move Hronek was somewhat puzzling. He was just 25 years old and still had another year remaining on his contract. While the package Detroit received was good value, Hronek was not necessarily a player the Red Wings needed to move at that stage of the rebuild, especially considering the hole it created at the top of their defensive core.

Yzerman’s 2022 draft followed a similar pattern to the previous ones. Detroit landed a promising player in Marco Kasper at eighth overall, but the rest of the class has yet to produce any meaningful NHL impact. To this point, none of the other eight players selected in that draft have appeared in an NHL game.

The 2023 offseason was another somewhat aggressive one for Yzerman. He traded Dominik Kubalik, Donovan Sebrango, a first-round pick, and a fourth-round pick to Ottawa in exchange for Alex DeBrincat. Yzerman was also active in free agency, signing Justin Holl and J.T. Compher to multi-year deals.

The DeBrincat trade was excellent value for Detroit, but it again signalled that Yzerman believed the rebuild phase was largely over. The free agency signings were much more questionable. Holl and Compher were not bargain under-the-radar finds or players coming off breakout seasons, making the long-term commitments somewhat difficult to justify for a team that was still trying to establish itself.

From this point on, it is difficult to fully judge Detroit’s draft classes since many of the players have not yet had enough time to earn meaningful NHL opportunities. That said, the Red Wings’ top three selections in 2023, Nate Danielson, Axel Sandin-Pellikka, and Trey Augustine, have all looked like promising prospects so far.

The 2023–24 season did show some positive growth for Detroit. The Red Wings finished with a 41–32–9 record and spent much of the year in a playoff position. However, a late-season collapse, including a 3–9–2 record in March, ultimately caused them to fall just short of ending their playoff drought once again.

Today

The 2024 offseason began with Yzerman having to dump a second-round pick to move the contract of Jake Walman, a very solid defenseman, as the consequences of the previous two offseasons finally caught up to the team. Detroit also continued its revolving door in goal by signing Cam Talbot to a two-year deal. In addition, the Red Wings added veteran forwards Vladimir Tarasenko and Patrick Kane.

Detroit would go on to finish the 2024–25 season with a 39–35–8 record, once again missing the playoffs.

The Red Wings remained aggressive the following year. During the 2025 offseason, Detroit acquired John Gibson in hopes that he could finally stabilize the team’s goaltending situation. They also recently moved a first-round pick at the trade deadline to acquire Justin Faulk from the St. Louis Blues.

As things currently stand, Detroit sits three points ahead of a playoff spot with 17 games remaining in the 2025–26 season.

Some of Yzerman’s tenure can be chalked up to bad luck. Betting on players like Jakub Vrana and Alex Nedeljkovic could have easily worked out in his favour, but the consistent overpays in free agency are much harder to justify. At a certain point, those decisions have to be viewed as reckless spending rather than calculated risks.

Drafting is another area where Detroit has struggled. During his time in Tampa Bay, Yzerman built a reputation for finding mid-to-late round steals. Players like Nikita Kucherov (R2), Taylor Raddysh (R2), Radko Gudas (R3), Brayden Point (R3), Anthony Cirelli (R3), Cedric Paquette (R4), Mathieu Joseph (R4), Ross Colton (R4), Nick Perbix (R6), and Ondrej Palat (R7) all developed into solid NHL players, with many playing major roles in Tampa Bay’s back-to-back Stanley Cup championships.

In Detroit, that level of draft success has simply not been there. Second-round pick Albert Johansson and seventh-round pick Emmitt Finnie are currently the only non–first–round selections from the Yzerman era on the Red Wings roster.

This isn’t to say Yzerman has been the worst GM in the league. However, another playoff miss after holding a top-eight spot for much of the season would be a significant blemish on his tenure in Detroit. Ultimately, the biggest challenge for both Red Wings fans and ownership may be separating the results from the name of the man overseeing them.

So I’ll leave you with this question: if everything outlined in this article had been done by a first-time GM that no one had ever heard of, would he still have a job?

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Now that the dust has settled on an all-time classic gold medal game between Canada and the United States, it feels like the right time to take a step back and look at how Canada built this roster. Unlike most Olympic teams, Canada and the U.S. aren’t questioned for their talent level. They’re questioned for their choices. When nearly 70% of the NHL player pool comes from those two countries, cutting that down to 25 players is less about finding good players and more about building the right mix.

From the start, there were some clear structural concerns with Team Canada, especially on the blue line. The balance of skill sets didn’t fully match what the modern international game demands, and that became more noticeable as the tournament went on. By the medal round, issues with role fit, puck movement, and matchup flexibility were hard to ignore. In my view, those roster decisions were a major factor in both Canada’s late-tournament struggles and the final result.

The Canadian blue line did not play poorly. In fact, none of the seven defensemen who saw regular minutes “lost“ Canada a game. If anything, the group exceeded expectations in how often they activated and helped generate offence.

The problem was what happened after those plays were created. Canada lacked enough defensemen who could either finish those chances themselves or consistently move the puck up ice with pace and control. In a tournament where transition speed and clean exits were critical, that limitation became more apparent as the competition tightened.

Both of these issues were predictable and, more importantly, avoidable. Canada leaned toward safer, lower-risk profiles on the back end, and that conservative approach ultimately reduced their ability to play the fast, possession-driven game that has defined recent international success.

Cale Makar was clearly the offensive driver of the group. He led Canadian defensemen in points (6), goals (2), chance creations (15), and total chance contributions (26). Much of Canada’s blue line offence ran through him. Thomas Harley also had a solid tournament, finishing second among Canadian defensemen in points, chances, and overall contributions.

Shea Theodore graded out as Canada’s third-most productive offensive defenseman, recording 12 chance contributions and two points. However, his limited minutes held him back from possibly being a bigger contributor. He averaged 13:18 per game, ranking sixth among Canadian defensemen in total minutes, essentially rotating on the third pair with Doughty (13:17) and Sanheim (13:14).

The issue was not Theodore’s role. The issue was depth. Once Josh Morrissey went down early in the opening game, Canada no longer had a second high-end puck mover who could consistently transport the puck, extend possessions, and support the attack. From that point on, the offensive burden fell almost entirely on Makar, which made Canada’s transition game more predictable and easier to pressure. The frustrating part is that a similar situation came up at the end of the 4 Nations tournament last year, but wins can hide blemishes better than anything.

The lack of blue line creation became especially noticeable in Canada’s 3–2 semifinal win over Finland. Travis Sanheim led all Canadian defensemen in chance contributions and recorded three slot attempts in that game. He finished with no goals and a single assist on Theodore’s tally.

This isn’t a criticism of Sanheim. In fact, it was likely his strongest performance of the tournament. But that’s exactly the point. When a defenseman whose primary profile is not as a high-end offensive driver is leading your blue line in chance creation, it highlights a structural imbalance. Canada was generating looks from the back end, but not consistently through players best suited to convert or extend those sequences.

A tweet from Thomas Drance during that game captured this dynamic perfectly.

So what could Canada have done differently?

Matthew Schaefer is one of the most obvious answers. The 18-year-old is currently fourth among defensemen in goals and 12th in points, while also ranking 13th in shooting percentage among blueliners with at least 500 minutes played. That kind of production profile is exactly what Canada lacked once Morrissey went down.

The primary concern around Schaefer was experience. There was understandable hesitation about bringing a teenager into a high-pressure, short tournament. But we’ve just watched Macklin Celebrini step into the Olympics and turn into Canada’s second-best forward, and that should change how Hockey Canada evaluates elite young talent. At a certain point, impact and skill set have to outweigh age, especially in a best-on-best environment where transition speed and offensive support from the blue line are essential.

If the preference was for a more established NHL option, Evan Bouchard was the obvious choice.

Over the past season and a half, Bouchard ranks fourth among NHL defensemen in both goals and total points. He also brings exactly the kind of big-game résumé Hockey Canada prioritized. Across the last two postseasons, Bouchard leads all defensemen in goals and points per 60 minutes at both even strength and in all situations. His even-strength playoff production sits at 2.07 points per 60, a full tier above the next-best defenseman at 1.48. Among elite comparables, Makar ranks seventh at 1.31.

The common pushback is that Connor McDavid inflates Bouchard’s numbers. This isn’t a theory I fully buy into, but in an Olympic setting, that argument actually works in Canada’s favour. They could have deployed Bouchard and McDavid together in offensive-zone situations, maximizing a proven chemistry that already drives elite playoff production.

Defensively, Bouchard has limitations. But the Olympic format allows teams to dress seven defensemen, which makes sheltering a specialist far easier. Canada could have managed his minutes, leaned on him for offensive deployments, and reduced his usage once protecting a lead. Instead, they opted for safer, lower-ceiling profiles and left a high-impact offensive weapon at home.

Even beyond Schaefer and Bouchard, Canada had several more balanced options available. Noah Dobson is a strong puck mover who can run a power play and play heavy minutes in transition. MacKenzie Weegar offers strong defensive results while still moving the puck efficiently and supporting possession. Jakob Chychrun, who currently leads all NHL defensemen in goals, brings a shooting threat from the back end that Canada simply did not have outside of Makar.

None of these players are one-dimensional specialists. Each combines puck movement with either offensive finishing or strong defensive impacts. More importantly, they represent skill sets that better align with the pace and transition demands of the international game.

Were there issues elsewhere in the lineup? Absolutely. The decision to take Sam Bennett over Connor Bedard was difficult to justify, especially with Marchand and Wilson already filling the physical, forechecking roles. With Brayden Point unavailable, Canada was short on high-end secondary scoring, and Bedard’s shooting talent could have addressed that immediately.

That said, the blue line is where the most meaningful changes are needed. Teams consistently clogged the middle of the ice when Canada had offensive-zone possession, forcing play back to the point. In those situations, Canada didn’t have enough defensemen who could either get pucks through traffic, attack downhill, or quickly reset the cycle to maintain pressure.

Canada does not have a talent problem. It has a roster construction problem. The international game is faster, more transition-driven, and increasingly reliant on puck-moving defensemen who can extend possessions and contribute offensively. Without that layer, even a high-skill forward group becomes easier to contain.

Canada will get another opportunity to reclaim a world title in 2028. The key question is whether this loss is treated as a learning moment or dismissed as a result of being “one goal away.” The margin at this level is always one goal. The process behind how you build the roster is what determines which side of that margin you end up on.

Stat cards and shot charts from Hockeystats.com

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Fifty-six games into the season, the Calgary Flames sit 14th in the Western Conference, 11 points back of a playoff spot. As I discussed previously, even making up five standings points is historically difficult for non-playoff teams. Climbing an 11-point gap with only 26 games remaining suggests Calgary should be operating firmly in sell mode. The Flames have already moved Rasmus Andersson to Vegas, and their most significant remaining trade chip is 35-year-old Nazem Kadri.

Kadri’s name has generated considerable interest, largely due to the lack of center depth on this year’s trade market. But interest does not always equal value. The key question for contenders is not whether Kadri can help, but whether his on-ice impact, contract structure, and usage profile make him a net positive acquisition.

Kadri has always been a strong distributor, and that part of his game has held up well with age. Per AllThreeZones, he sat in the 90th percentile league-wide in primary shot assists in 2024-25. Although he’s been an elite distributor, he has only reached the 30-goal mark three times in his career. He remains an effective play driver, ranking near the top of the league in controlled zone entries and rush shot generation. His ability to carry the puck through transition is still one of his strongest skills and a major reason his underlying offensive metrics have aged better than his raw point totals. A team looking for someone to finish plays might be disappointed in a Kadri acquisition, but one looking for a play-driving centre should be pretty happy adding him to their roster.

In the offensive zone, Kadri consistently makes possession-preserving decisions. Rather than forcing plays into traffic, he will move pucks back to the point and extend zone time, which helps his line maintain pressure. He also adds value by drawing penalties. Over the past two and a half seasons, he ranks second among forwards in penalties drawn, trailing only Tim Stützle.

There are legitimate concerns, however. Kadri’s skating has never been a strength and has declined with age. He averages 36 20-22 MPH bursts per game, while the league average sits around 54. Kadri also does not provide much physical pressure, averaging just 67.4 hits per season since 2017–18, which limits his effectiveness as a forechecking or matchup centre in heavier playoff environments.

His point production has trended downward over the past three seasons and he is currently on pace for his lowest points-per-82 rate in that span. Some of this decline should be put on the Flames offensive production as a team. Over that same period, Calgary has averaged just 2.24 goals per 60, third worst in the league, so he has not been supported by a particularly strong offensive environment. A move to a deeper lineup with more efficient finishing talent could help stabilize his counting stats.

If Kadri were purely a rental, this would be a more straightforward bet. The primary obstacle is his contract. He carries a $7 million cap hit, a 13-team no-trade list, and three additional years of term beyond this season. For teams that are not clearly in a cup-or-bust window, that is a significant commitment for a player already showing signs of decline. Salary retention could make the cap hit more manageable, but the term remains the central risk, particularly for contenders operating close to the cap.

Kadri is still a useful player, but he is no longer a player you build a line around. His playmaking, transition ability, and penalty drawing give him clear value in a sheltered middle-six role, particularly on a team that can surround him with finishers and limit his matchup exposure. In the right environment, he can still tilt the ice and contribute to secondary scoring.

The challenge is that his contract prices him like he’s more than that. The term and cap hit mean that any acquiring team is taking on future risk for present value, which narrows the list of logical trade partners to true contenders.

Multiple teams have been rumoured to be in the mix for Kadri, including Montreal, Utah, Colorado, Dallas, and Minnesota. All of which would need to move out salary and/or have the Flames retain to make a deal work.

In a thin center market, there will be interest. The question is whether a contender is willing to pay for what Kadri still is, rather than what his reputation suggests.

• Skating data from NHL Edge

• Microstats and player cards from HockeyStats.com

• Contract details from PuckPedia

• Hitting numbers from EvolvingHockey

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With about 25 games left in the 2025–26 season, the playoff race is set to heat up as soon as the NHL returns from the Olympic break. With roughly 50 points still available, teams sitting around five points out of a playoff spot have to feel like they are firmly in the mix. After all, 2.5 games worth of points does not sound like a steep hill to climb. But is it?

Several factors complicate the chase. Do you have games in hand on the team ahead of you? How many teams do you need to leapfrog? Are those teams winning, or at least collecting overtime points? Are the teams you’re trying to chase playing each other? All of this makes a playoff push far more difficult than simply putting together a three-game winning streak.

With that in mind, how long does it actually take to climb back from a 5+ point deficit? For this study, we examined the last ten NHL seasons (excluding 2020–21 due to the division-only schedule) and tracked every instance of a team falling five or more points outside a playoff position. Once a team returned to a top-eight spot in its conference, we recorded how many games it took to get there. Keep in mind, teams could fall back behind the 5-point threshold and would therefore count as another data point for that season.

Here are the results.

A few things become clear as soon as you look at the data. First, it takes far longer than three good games to close the gap. In fact, only five teams have climbed back into a playoff spot in just three games: the Panthers did it twice (2017, 2023), along with the Hurricanes (2018), Wild (2019), and Oilers (2022).

On average, it takes 17 games to complete the climb. A handful of extreme outliers, including a 63-game recovery (Arizona in 2018-19), pull that number upward, so the median of 12 games is likely a better representation of a typical comeback. For the purposes of this analysis, splitting the difference and using 14 games provides a reasonable benchmark.

That number also highlights how narrow the window really is. Even if your team becomes part of the 42% that successfully make it back, you likely need at least 14 games remaining in the season to give yourself a realistic chance. Over that span, you are gaining roughly 0.36 standings points per game on the playoff line, which is a significant pace to sustain. Framed this way, a five-point gap starts to look much less manageable.

Another important consideration is sustainability. Returning to a playoff position in mid-February does not guarantee anything if that spot cannot be held through Game 82. Below is a chart outlining how all 70 teams that successfully climbed back into a playoff spot saw their season end.

This additional layer of data reinforces just how difficult the climb really is. Teams have only a ~42% chance of getting back into a playoff position at all, and even when they do, they hold that spot through the end of the season just ~44% of the time. Combined, that means once a team falls 5+ points out, it has only an 18.7% chance of finishing the year in a playoff position.

On a more encouraging note, falling five points back is not necessarily a death sentence. In 4/9 (44%) of the seasons we studied, the eventual Stanley Cup champion had, at one point, been at least five points outside the playoff picture (PIT, STL, TBL, & COL). The Final itself featured two such teams in the same season on two occasions (PIT–SJS and DAL–TBL), showing that while the odds are long, elite teams can still overcome the deficit.

So what does this all mean?

A 5+ point deficit appears to be a meaningful decision-making threshold for front offices. While the gap is easier to close earlier in the season, needing roughly 17% of your schedule just to climb back into a playoff spot is a significant task. At the same time, selling when you are only “2.5 games back” can send a negative message to both the locker room and the fan base. As noted earlier, that gap feels manageable before you look into the data, so moving into sell mode at that point may be perceived as an early concession.

Context also matters. In theory, making up five points while chasing a single team for the final spot (9th to 8th) is far more realistic than doing so from 11th or 12th, where multiple teams need to be leapfrogged. Incorporating the number of teams ahead into future analysis could provide a clearer picture of true playoff probability.

The NHL standings make a five-point gap look small. In reality, the data shows it is anything but that. Climbing back into a playoff spot typically requires one month of elite results and a margin for error that most clubs simply do not have. While comebacks are possible, they are far less common and far more time-consuming than the “only 2.5 games back” narrative suggests.

Special thanks to Emily Fehr, who helped out with the data collection.

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